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COMMENT 
THE AFTERMATH OF IN RE 2001 
REDISTRICTING CASES: THE 
NEED FOR A NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME FOR 
LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING IN 
ALASKA 
GORDON S. HARRISON* 
In this Comment, the former executive director of the Alaska Redis-
tricting Board argues that the proper forum for redistricting in 
Alaska is the state legislature, with procedural safeguards to ensure 
the minority party a voice.  This Comment describes the history of 
redistricting and the process by which the 2000 districts were formu-
lated.  This Comment analyzes the process and critiques its short-
falls; it concludes that a change in redistricting policy is needed to 
avoid litigation and provide for more equitable redistricting to occur. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Redistricting of the Alaska State Legislature after the 2000 
census proceeded under the terms of a 1998 state constitutional 
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amendment that placed full authority for the task in the hands of 
an independent, five-member public body—the Alaska Redistrict-
ing Board.  A three-member majority of the Board adopted a re-
districting plan prepared by a group closely associated with the 
Democratic Party.  Litigation ensued.  Though the Alaska Superior 
Court and the Alaska Supreme Court found several constitutional 
defects in the plan and remanded it to the Board for further work, 
neither court faulted the procedures by which the plan was 
adopted.  On remand, the Board unanimously adopted a revision 
of the plan that was negotiated between a board member, plaintiffs 
in the suits, and key legislators.  The courts found that this revision 
satisfied their objections to the first plan. 
New legislative districts were in place for the 2002 elections, 
but from a public policy perspective, Alaska’s experiment with an 
independent redistricting commission cannot be considered a suc-
cess.  The Alaska Redistricting Board perpetuates the objection-
able feature of the system it replaced: redistricting by a single 
party.  If one-party redistricting is to be avoided, another approach 
must be found.  This Comment proposes that the task be returned 
to the legislature, the body commonly empowered in other states to 
redraw legislative district lines.  However, if the objective is (as it 
should be) a bipartisan plan, both major parties must be assured a 
role.  Bipartisan participation in the process can be achieved by re-
quiring a supermajority vote to adopt a redistricting bill.  To assure 
effective participation by the minority legislative faction, there 
must be a constitutional guarantee of equal access to staff and 
other resources necessary to prepare redistricting proposals.  Fi-
nally, there must be a deadline for the legislature to pass a redis-
tricting bill similar to the deadline that was imposed on the Board 
by the recent constitutional amendment. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Problem of Partisan Gerrymanders 
The call to abandon the 1998 constitutional amendment that 
created the Alaska Redistricting Board is premised on the notion 
that one political party should not have full authority for redistrict-
ing.  A party that draws election district boundaries does so with 
the principal objective of enhancing its own electoral prospects.  
Manipulating election district boundaries for partisan advantage 
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has a name—gerrymandering—and it is a tradition in American 
politics.1 
Partisan gerrymandering is tolerated by some who consider it 
an inevitable fact of political life,2 a non-problem,3 a non-serious 
problem,4 or a problem that, however regrettable, is so complex 
there is no feasible way for judges to police it.5  Toleration of parti-
san gerrymandering is unfortunate because gerrymandering is elec-
tion fraud,6 no less pernicious than stuffing the ballot box or intimi-
 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (8th ed. 2004) (defining gerrymandering as 
“[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts . . . to give 
one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting 
strength”).  The term “gerrymander” was coined in 1812 to describe a set of dis-
tricts that resembled a salamander drawn by Massachusetts Governor Elbridge 
Gerry.  Id. at 709.  However, the practice goes further back into American politi-
cal history, and there is ample literature on the subject.  See, e.g., BACKSTROM ET 
AL., POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS (Bernard Grofman ed., 
1990). 
 2. See, e.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Leg-
islative Districting in the Public Interest: Elusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
4 (1985) (“[T]here are no coherent public interest criteria for legislative districting 
independent of substantive conceptions of the public interest, disputes about 
which constitute the very stuff of politics.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The 
Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 649 (2002) (arguing that state and federal elections are sufficiently com-
petitive and that factors other than partisan redistricting account for problems 
perceived by those who seek reform of the redistricting process). 
 4. Michael A. Carvin & Louis K. Fisher, “A Legislative Task”: Why Four 
Types of Districting Challenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 
4 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2005) (arguing that gerrymandering causes little long-term po-
litical harm). 
 5. See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and 
the Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1987) (“I do not 
wish to defend partisan gerrymandering.  That practice, motivated as it is by nar-
row, self-interested ends, offends the ideal of public-regarding politics toward 
which our polity should strive.  But the Constitution does not demand human, 
much less political, perfection; its tolerance for much that is repugnant to fastidi-
ous citizens is a price that we pay for a robust, relatively open-ended political life.  
Judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering would be a cure worse than the 
disease . . . .”). 
 6. Gerrymandering has been characterized as polite political fraud.  See 
Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a 
Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
301, 309–13 (1991).  It has also been asserted that an incumbent gerrymander 
“perverts the democratic system, undermines legitimacy and accountability, en-
courages voter apathy, and institutionalizes a racial bias.”  Kristen Silverberg, 
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dating or bribing voters.7  The gerrymandered district is designed to 
squander the votes of the opposition party by “packing” large ma-
jorities of opposition voters into a few districts or by “cracking” 
districts controlled by opposition voters into numerous districts 
that can be won by a small margin of voters of the dominant party.8  
The practice dilutes the votes of the disadvantaged party members, 
making it harder for that party to translate its voting strength into 
legislative seats.9  A gerrymandered political system is unrespon-
sive to changes in the will of the electorate.10  Partisan gerryman-
dering, in short, is an affront to constitutional democracy.11  It is 
hostile to the notion of “fair and effective representation for all 
 
Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEX. L. REV. 913, 913 
(1996).  See also Brian O’Neill, Note, The Case for Federal Anti-Gerrymandering 
Legislation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 683 (2005). 
 7. Gerrymanders designed to disadvantage racial minorities are acknowl-
edged to be effective and constitutionally abhorrent.  Partisan gerrymanders are 
equally so.  The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged that partisan gerryman-
ders can be constitutionally offensive.  See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); 
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).  But the justices are hopelessly divided 
over what, if anything, they can or should do about it.  See Michael Weaver, Note, 
Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision over Partisan Gerrymanders in Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273 (2005). 
 8. A gerrymandered district may also simply remove a legislator from his 
constituency or place two or more minority party incumbents in the same district 
(thus eliminating all but one) and open a new district to candidates lacking the ad-
vantages of incumbency.  Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw 
the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552 
(2004) (defining the technique of “shacking”). 
 9. There are several reasons why the percentage of seats obtained by a party 
in a legislative body is not equal to the percentage of total votes cast for that party, 
but the main reason is the U.S. system of single-member district, plurality elec-
tions.  Because of this, deviation from strict proportional representation is not 
necessarily evidence of gerrymandering.  The issue is the responsiveness of the 
electoral system to changes in voter preferences.  Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness 
and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 765 (2004); Richard G. Niemi, 
The Swing Ratio as a Measure of Partisan Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 171 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). 
 10. This is the crux of the gerrymander problem.  See Cox, supra note 9, at 
765. 
 11. “[I]t is a fundamental tenet of American democracy that a representative 
government be responsive to the changing will of the electorate.  To create a dis-
tricting plan which would be largely insensitive to electoral changes that may oc-
cur over the course of a decade, because a particular partisan imbalance is ‘locked 
in’ through the use of dispersal and concentration techniques of gerrymandering, 
violates this fundamental tenet.”  Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A So-
cial Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 112 (1985). 
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citizens,”12 and the public policy of the state of Alaska should seek 
to prevent it. 
B. Original Alaska Constitutional Provisions for Redistricting 
The delegates drafting the new Alaska Constitution in Fair-
banks during the winter of 1955–1956 almost certainly sought to 
prevent gerrymandering in Alaska.13  They adopted a novel mecha-
nism designed both to thwart partisan redistricting and to ensure 
timely redistricting—avoidance of the task was a major political 
problem of the day, as many legislatures around the country had a 
history of dilatory behavior perpetuating unequal legislative dis-
tricts.14  Possibly to counter the inclination of legislatures to pro-
crastinate about redistricting, the delegates gave the governor re-
sponsibility for the task.15  It seems likely that the delegates created 
 
 12. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964) (“achieving of fair and ef-
fective representation for all citizens is concededly the basic aim of legislative ap-
portionment”). 
 13. The term “reapportionment” is used interchangeably with the term “redis-
tricting” in the Alaska Constitution.  “Reapportionment” refers to the realloca-
tion of seats to fixed districts, as for example the process by which Congress real-
locates its 435 seats to each of the fifty states.  “Redistricting” refers to the 
redrawing of election districts so that each district has an equal number of citizens.  
Thus, the states must redraw their internal congressional districts after a congres-
sional reapportionment (Alaska does not because it has only one congressional 
seat), and they must periodically redraw state legislative districts to comply with 
state and federal law requiring numerical equality.  At the time of Alaska’s consti-
tutional convention, the process for state legislatures involved elements of both 
reapportionment and redistricting, but it was generally called reapportionment.  
Today there are few fixed legislative district boundaries in the United States, and 
the preferred term is redistricting. 
 14. A 1952 observer noted, “between 1940 and 1950 only 18 states bothered to 
reapportion.  Ten did not reapportion between 1930 and 1940.  Mississippi’s last 
reapportionment was made in 1890, Delaware’s in 1897, and in Illinois and Ala-
bama the last was in 1901.  Connecticut established its present apportionment for 
the lower chamber in 1818 and for the senate in 1903.”  Lashley G. Harvey, Reap-
portionments of State Legislatures—Legal Requirements, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 364, 371–72 (1952).  This was the backdrop to deliberations at the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention and to the landmark federal reapportionment rulings 
of the 1960s.  The first court decision was Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
which established the justiciability of constitutional challenges to mis-apportioned 
districts.  Another was Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which required both 
houses of state bicameral legislatures to be apportioned exclusively on the basis of 
population. 
 15. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 3 (amended 1999). 
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a Redistricting Board16 to advise the governor so as to counter the 
universal inclination of politicians to gerrymander.  The Board was 
to prepare in public a plan for the governor, who could make 
changes to the plan only if he provided an explanation of why the 
changes were needed.17  As a safeguard for the whole system, the 
delegates authorized citizens to compel the governor to correct any 
lapses in the procedure or “errors” in the redistricting plan.18 
It is clear that the delegates intended the advisory board to be 
politically impartial and intended redistricting plans to be politi-
cally unbiased because of the limitations set on its composition.  
For instance, the governor appointed the five–person Board, but 
members had to come from around the state.19  Members could not 
be public officials; moreover, they were to be appointed “without 
regard for political affiliation.”20  Discussion on the floor of the 
convention about the reapportionment article was unambiguous in 
demonstrating the delegates’ intent to provide a politically neutral 
process.  Delegate John Hellenthal, chairman of the Committee on 
Suffrage, Elections, and Apportionment, declared that “the whole 
purpose of this article is to de-emphasize politics.”21  He explained 
that public officials were barred from serving on the Board because 
these people would be “too politically inclined” and “apt to live in 
too much of a political atmosphere.”22  He characterized the advi-
sory body as “this objective, studious board.”23  Delegate Steve 
McCutcheon spoke against an amendment to allow public officials 
to serve on the Board, saying the Board “is only one small board 
that sits once every ten years and certainly we should be able to 
find five or six people out of the whole of Alaska that would qual-
ify for this thing and who will be objective in their consideration.”24 
The draft article used the term “nonpartisan” to describe the 
citizen advisory board, but it was subsequently dropped by the 
Committee on Style and Drafting in favor of the requirement that 
appointments be made “without regard to political affiliation.”25  
Members of the Apportionment Committee objected to the 
 
 16. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8 (amended 1999). 
 17. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 10 (amended 1999). 
 18. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 11 (amended 1999). 
 19. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(b) (amended 1999). 
 20. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a) (amended 1999). 
 21. MINUTES OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS, ALASKA CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 1958 (Alaska Legislative Council, 1965). 
 22. Id., at 1955. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 3448. 
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change, complaining that the new language failed to express the 
full intent of “nonpartisan”; instead, they insisted on adding a new 
sentence: “Deliberations and decisions of the board shall be free 
from political considerations.”26  The term “political” was later 
changed to “partisan,” but on reflection the delegates decided to 
strike the entire sentence from the final document on the grounds 
that such an admonition was unlikely to be effective.27 
In an ebullient article describing the new constitution, Con-
vention Chair and later-Governor William Egan wrote: “Members 
of the legislature will have nothing to do with reapportionment.  
Because of this provision so-called ‘gerrymandering’ will be impos-
sible.”28  Delegate Hellenthal also published an article about the 
new constitution.29  Among several “modern and progressive” fea-
tures dealing with the legislature, he included “[a]utomatic reap-
portionment every ten years by the governor acting on the advice 
of an independent board.”30  Others were equally enthusiastic 
about the innovative redistricting provisions of Alaska’s new con-
stitution.  The National Municipal League adopted the scheme for 
the sixth edition of the Model State Constitution, expressing confi-
dence that the advisory board and judicial review would restrain 
the governor from partisan gerrymandering.31 
C. History of Alaska Redistricting Prior to 2000 
The original redistricting procedures of Article VI of the 
Alaska Constitution were used following the 1970, 1980, and 1990 
 
 26. Id.  Delegate Edward Davis explained to the convention that the commit-
tee on apportionment “intended that the board should actually in all respects act 
as a nonpolitical body, and accordingly asked us to add another sentence which 
would make it clear that the board was to act without regard to partisan politics.”  
Id. 
 27. Id. at 3479–80.  Delegate McCutcheon sought to have the provision elimi-
nated, arguing “it is difficult to police the mind, and, if the intention of politics en-
ters into a person’s mind and they are so swayed, you certainly can’t rule it out 
with a simple sentence of this nature.  I think it is a frivolous inclusion.”  Id. at 
3479. 
 28. William A. Egan, The Constitution of the New State of Alaska, 31 STATE 
GOVERNMENT 209, 212 (1958). 
 29. John S. Hellenthal, Alaska’s Heralded Constitution: The Forty-Ninth State 
Sets an Example, 44 A.B.A. J. 1147 (1958). 
 30. Id. at 1149. 
 31. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION (6th 
ed. 1963); see also GORDON E. BAKER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: 
REAPPORTIONMENT (1960). 
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decennial censuses.32  Every redistricting plan initially adopted by 
the governor was taken to court, and the ensuing litigation was of-
ten contentious, lengthy, and partisan. 
Following the 1970 census, Governor Egan, a Democrat, con-
vened an advisory board and proclaimed a redistricting plan on 
December 30, 1971.33  Jay Hammond, a Republican, and fourteen 
other legislators sued, culminating in a decision by the Alaska Su-
preme Court.34  The court found the plan unconstitutional because 
of excessive variation in the population of the legislative districts 
and remanded the plan to the governor.35  However, because the 
filing deadline for legislative seats was not far off, the court ap-
pointed two masters to draw up an interim plan for the 1972 elec-
tions.36  The court considered and rejected objections to the interim 
plan on June 19, 1972, and ordered its adoption.37  Governor Egan 
started again with a new advisory board and proclaimed a second 
plan on December 11, 1973.38  Cliff Groh, a Republican state sena-
tor, headlined the suit.  The superior court upheld the plan, but in 
Groh v. Egan,39 the Alaska Supreme Court found impermissible 
population disparities in several districts and sent the plan back to 
the governor.40  Egan submitted a revised plan, and the court ap-
proved it on June 14, 1974.41 
 
 32. In 1964, Governor Egan initiated a redistricting of the Senate to bring 
Alaska into compliance with Reynolds v. Sims (as eight of the twenty Senate seats 
were apportioned on the basis of geography rather than population).  He used the 
constitutional procedures for redistricting the House, as there were none for the 
State Senate.  See Wade v. Nolan, 414 P.2d 689, 690–93 (Alaska 1966).  The plan 
reallocated several seats from rural to urban areas, and it required all Senate seats 
to be filled at the upcoming primary and general elections, thus truncating terms 
of half of the incumbent Senators.  Fifteen Senators, all Democrats, challenged the 
governor’s power to redistrict the Senate in the absence of a constitutional 
amendment to Article VI.  The superior court ruled for the plaintiffs.  The state 
appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the governor’s action, pending 
an amendment that updated Article VI.  See id. at 706. 
 33. See Egan v. Hammond, 502 P.2d 856, 859 (Alaska 1972) (citing Proclama-
tion of Reapportionment and Redistricting, Dec. 30, 1971). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 864–65. 
 36. Id. at 859. 
 37. Id. at 874. 
 38.  See Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 865 (Alaska 1974). 
 39. 526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974). 
 40. Id. at 882.  The court found inadequate justification for variations of cer-
tain House district populations from plus 10.9% (Bristol Bay) and plus 7.4% 
(Fairbanks) to minus 5.9%, 6.5%, and 8.6% in the Anchorage area.  Id. at 878. 
 41. See id. at 888–89. 
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Jay Hammond succeeded William Egan as governor in 1974 
and was reelected in 1978.  It was Hammond’s turn to proclaim a 
redistricting plan following the 1980 census, which he did on July 
24, 1981.42  Marilyn Carpenter, vice-chair of the Alaska Democratic 
Party, brought suit against the state.  The superior court upheld the 
plan and she appealed.  In Carpenter v. Hammond,43 the supreme 
court held that inclusion of the City of Cordova in a district within 
southeast Alaska violated the state constitutional requirement that 
districts should contain (as nearly as practicable) a relatively inte-
grated socioeconomic area; the supreme court remanded the mat-
ter to the superior court.44 
The task of revising Hammond’s plan fell to Governor William 
Sheffield, a Democrat, who succeeded Hammond in the general 
election of 1982.  Sheffield issued an executive proclamation of re-
districting on February 16, 1984.45  The Kenai Peninsula Borough 
and seven residents of House District 7 filed suit over the bizarrely 
configured District 7 (the “doughnut district”).  In Kenai Peninsula 
Borough v. State,46 the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that the district was unconstitutional but found the flaw’s 
effect to be de minimis and did not require the governor to recon-
figure the district.47  It may have been that the court recognized that 
it was now 1987 and there would be only one more general election 
before the next round of redistricting began. 
After the 1990 census, the task of redistricting fell to the ad-
ministration of Governor Walter Hickel.  The governor proclaimed 
a redistricting plan on September 5, 1991.48  The Southeast Confer-
ence (an alliance of municipalities in Alaska’s southeast panhan-
dle), several individuals, and the Democratic Party sued.  The su-
perior court found numerous constitutional problems with the plan, 
and the supreme court agreed with most of the lower court’s as-
sessment in deciding Hickel v. Southeast Conference.49  That deci-
sion came on May 28, 1992, and as in the 1970s redistricting litiga-
tion, the deadline for filing for the next general election was at 
 
 42. See Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Alaska 1983) (citing 
Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting, July 24, 1981). 
 43. 667 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1983). 
 44. Id. at 1215. 
 45. See Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Alaska 1987) 
(citing Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting, Feb. 16, 1984). 
 46. 743 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1987). 
 47. Id. at 1373. 
 48. See Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 66 (Alaska 1992) (citing 
Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting, Sept. 5, 1991). 
 49. 846 P.2d 38, 56–57 (Alaska 1992). 
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hand.  Thus, the court directed the governor to revise the plan, but 
for the 1992 elections the court ordered an interim plan prepared 
by court-appointed masters.50 
Governor Hickel’s Reapportionment Board reconvened in 
November 1992 and delivered a new plan to the governor, who for-
mally adopted it on May 27, 1993.51  An alleged violation of the 
Federal Voting Rights Act required yet another revision to the 
plan,52 which was proclaimed on March 25, 1994.53 There were no 
further court challenges at this time, most likely because there was 
little to be gained by another round of litigation, and everyone was 
exhausted. 
Following the legal battles after the 1990 redistricting cycle, 
many Alaskans were convinced that the original constitutional 
scheme was not working.  Safeguards against biased redistricting 
appeared to be ineffective, and the drawing of election districts af-
ter each federal census was the sole prerogative of the governor’s 
party. 
D. 1998 Constitutional Amendment 
During the decade of the 1990s, Alaska’s legislators consid-
ered multiple proposals to amend the redistricting procedures of 
Article VI of the state constitution.54  These efforts were not sur-
prising in view of the widespread disillusionment with the existing 
procedures.  The amendment, eventually adopted in 1998, created 
an independent board with two members appointed by the gover-
nor, one by the President of the Senate, one by the Speaker of the 
House, and one (the fifth member) by the Chief Justice of the 
Alaska Supreme Court.55  Republicans had substantial majorities in 
 
 50. See App. C, Alaska Supreme Ct. Corrected Order of Remand, June 8, 1992; 
App. F, Mem. and Order of the Superior Ct., June 19, 1992. 
 51. Proclamation of Permanent Reapportionment and Redistricting, May 27, 
1993. 
 52. Alaska is covered by Section 5 of the Federal Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(c) (2000), which requires all political jurisdictions in the state to seek prior 
approval from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for any change in electoral 
laws and procedures.  The DOJ objected to the reduction of the Native voting age 
population from 55.5% to 50.6% in House District 36. 
 53. Proclamation of Reapportionment and Redistricting, March 25, 1994. 
 54. H. Con. Res. 35, 20th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 1998); H.J. Res. 44, 20th 
Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 1998); S.J. Res. 36, 20th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 1998); H.J. 
Res. 36, 20th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1997); H.J. Res. 16, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. 
(Alaska 1993); S.J. Res. 10, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1993); S.J. Res. 47, 17th 
Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 1992); H.J. Res. 45, 17th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1991). 
 55. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8. 
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both houses of the legislature,56 and 1998 was a gubernatorial elec-
tion year.  If a Republican was elected governor, the party would 
control the redistricting process under either the existing proce-
dures or the proposed amendment.  But if the incumbent Democ-
ratic Governor, Tony Knowles, was reelected, the Democrats 
would control redistricting after the 2000 federal census under the 
existing procedures. However, under the proposed amendment, 
depending upon the loyalties of the Board’s fifth member, the De-
mocrats might not control redistricting.  Thus, a consideration of 
the Republican legislative majority may have been that they would 
still be able to control redistricting under the proposed amendment 
if the fifth member were sympathetic to their interests, even if their 
party lost the governor’s race. 
The legislature adopted Legislative Resolve 74 on May 12, 
1998.57  The Democratic Party campaigned against the measure,58 
but it was ratified by voters at the general election of November 3, 
1998, by a margin of 110,768 votes to 101,686.59 
As amended, Article VI, Section 3 of the Alaska Constitution 
directs the Alaska Redistricting Board to reapportion the State 
House of Representatives and Senate.60  The Board has five mem-
bers.61  The members must have been residents of the state for at 
least one year, may not be public officials, and may not run for leg-
islative office in the election following their service on the Board.62  
 
 56. Republicans outnumbered Democrats twenty-five to fifteen in the House 
and fourteen to seven in the Senate.  Alaska Legislature, Committee/Member In-
formation on the 20th Legislature, http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/commbr_info 
.asp?session=20 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
 57. H.J. Res. 44, 20th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 1998). 
 58. For instance, the chair of the Alaska Democratic Party, Deborah Bonito, 
wrote the statement in opposition to the measure that was published in the official 
state election pamphlet distributed prior to the election.  See STATE OF ALASKA, 
DIV. OF ELECTIONS, 1998 OFFICIAL ELECTION PAMPHLET, STATEMENT IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO REORGANIZE 
REAPPORTIONMENT BOARD (1998), available at 
http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/elections/1998oep/98bal3.htm. 
 59. STATE OF ALASKA, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, ELECTION SUMMARY REPORT 6 
(1998), available at http://www.ltgov.state.ak.us/elections/elect98/general/results 
.pdf.  Article XIII, Section 1 of the Alaska Constitution allows the legislature to 
propose constitutional amendments by a two-thirds majority vote of each house.  
Proposals are to be put on the ballot at the next general election, where they must 
garner a majority of the votes cast in order to be adopted.  ALASKA CONST. art. 
XIII, § 1. 
 60. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
 61. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(a). 
 62. Id. 
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The governor appoints two members, the presiding officers of the 
Alaska Senate and House each appoint one member, and the Chief 
Justice of the Alaska Supreme Court appoints the final member, in 
that order.63  Each of the four judicial districts of the state must be 
represented by at least one member.64 
Section 10 sets an ambitious timetable for the Board to do its 
work: thirty days after the Board receives the block-level census 
data from the U.S. Census Bureau, it must adopt a proposed redis-
tricting plan or plans.65  Ninety days after receipt of the data, the 
Board must adopt a final plan.66  There must be three affirmative 
votes to adopt a plan.67  This accelerated schedule, together with 
the provisions for dealing with litigation in Section 11 (discussed 
infra), is designed to get an approved redistricting plan in place be-
fore the filing deadline for the first legislative elections following 
the decennial census, and thus avoid the necessity of a court-
ordered interim plan. 
Section 11 permits any “qualified voter” to sue the Board in 
superior court to compel it to act or to “correct any error in redis-
tricting,” but such a suit must be brought within thirty days of the 
adoption of a final plan by the Board.68  On appeal, the case shall 
be reviewed by the Alaska Supreme Court on the law and the 
facts.69  At both levels, the courts must hear the matter on an expe-
dited basis. 
If the supreme court finds the plan “invalid,” it must return 
the plan to the Board for corrective action.70  If it finds fault with a 
second plan, “the matter may be referred again to the board.”71 
Section 4 specifies that there must be forty House districts and 
twenty Senate districts, the latter each composed of two House dis-
tricts.72  As there are forty representatives and twenty senators in 
 
 63. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8(b). 
 64. Id.  Four judicial districts existed on Jan. 1, 1999. 
 65. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 10(a). 
 66. Id. 
 67. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 10(b). 
 68. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 11.  In litigation over the Board’s plan in 2001 
the courts granted municipal governments standing to sue under this clause.  See 
Memorandum and Order at 22, In re 2001 Redistricting Cases v. Redistricting Bd., 
No. 3AN-01-8914 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/redistricing/litigation/Memorandum_and_Opinion.pdf. 
 69. ALASKA CONST. art VI, § 11. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  Alternatives to another remand are not specified.  See id. 
 72. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
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the Alaska Legislature,73 the amendment requires the use of single-
member districts (as opposed to multi-member districts used else-
where).74 
Section 6 specifies that all districts shall, as nearly as practica-
ble, contain equal population numbers, be composed of contiguous 
and compact territory, and contain a relatively integrated socio-
economic area.75  The Board is directed to give consideration to lo-
cal government boundaries, and “drainage and other geographic 
features” must be used in “describing boundaries whenever possi-
ble.”76  These guidelines are not new—the old Section 6 required 
the governor to follow them as well.77 
In 1999, the legislature passed Senate Bill 99, which set in mo-
tion certain preparations for the impending redistricting prior to 
the appointment of the Board.78  This measure also defined the 
phrase “decennial census of the United States” used in Article VI 
to mean enumeration figures unadjusted by either the federal Cen-
sus Bureau or the Alaska Redistricting Board.79  The Census Bu-
reau was contemplating use of sampling data and statistical tech-
niques to adjust enumeration results for over-count and under-
count of certain segments of the population, and previous Redis-
tricting Boards in Alaska had used surveys to eliminate non-
resident military personnel from the state’s population base.80  Both 
sets of adjustments were commonly thought to benefit Democrats.81 
 
 73. ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 74. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
 75. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Act of Apr. 23, 1999, S.B. 99, 21st Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1999). 
 79. Id. at § 3 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 15.10.200 (2004)). 
 80. The elimination of non-resident military personnel from the population 
base in previous redistricting is discussed at length in Carpenter v. Hammond, 667 
P.2d 1204, 1210–13 (Alaska 1983), and Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863, 869–74 
(Alaska 1974). 
 81. Observation of the author.  The U.S. Bureau of the Census decided not to 
adjust the enumeration figures.  U.S. Will Not Adjust 2000 Census Figures, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, at A16.  Likewise, the Alaska Redistricting Board decided 
not to adjust Alaska population figures by eliminating non-resident military per-
sonnel.  See ALASKA REDISTRICTING BD., REP. TO ACCOMPANY REDISTRICTING 
PROCLAMATION OF JUNE 18, 2001 at 3, available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/redistricting/proclamation/report.pdf [hereinafter 2001 
REPORT]. 
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E. Redistricting After the 2000 Census by the Alaska Redistrict-
ing Board 
1. Appointment of the Board.  Members of the Alaska Redis-
tricting Board were appointed in August 2000.  Governor Tony 
Knowles named Vicki Otte and Julian Mason, both of Anchorage.  
The Speaker of the House, Brian Porter, appointed Michael Less-
meier of Juneau.  Senate President Drue Pearce appointed Bert 
Sharp of Fairbanks.  Alaska Supreme Court Chief Justice Dana 
Fabe appointed Leona Okakok of Barrow.82  On many measures 
before the Board, and on the critical division over adoption of a fi-
nal plan, Board members Lessmeier and Sharp, the appointees of 
the Republican legislative leadership, formed a voting coalition.  
Members Mason and Otte, appointed by the Democratic governor, 
were joined by member Okakok to form a voting coalition that 
comprised a majority of the Board. 
In October 2000, the Board hired an executive director,83 who 
hired four other permanent employees and opened an office in 
Juneau.84  The U.S. Bureau of the Census delivered block-level 
population data to the Board’s office on March 19, 2001.85  Accord-
ingly, the constitutional amendment required the Board to adopt a 
draft plan by April 18, 2001, and a final plan by June 18, 2001.86 
2. Adoption of Draft Plans.  Between March 30 and April 6, 
2000, the Board held hearings in the cities of Anchorage, Palmer, 
Fairbanks, Juneau (teleconferenced statewide), Ketchikan, and Be-
thel to take public testimony on existing election district bounda-
ries and to receive general advice, ideas, and comments from the 
public about redistricting, before the Board began to develop draft 
plans.87  At these hearings the Board invited submission of pro-
posed plans by interested groups and individuals.88 
The Board began deliberating draft plans on April 10, 2001.  
Board members worked in pairs with each other and with staff.  
The product of the work sessions was reported and discussed at pe-
riodic public meetings.  This pattern continued until approximately 
noon on April 18.89  By then, the Board had received proposed re-
 
 82. 2001 REPORT, supra note 81, at 1. 
 83. The author was the executive director of the Alaska Redistricting Board. 
 84. 2001 REPORT, supra note 81, at 1–2. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 3. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
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districting plans from several groups, and it had provided an oppor-
tunity for a proponent of each plan to describe and discuss it with 
the Board.90  During the meeting of April 18, 2001, the Board 
adopted four plans and an alternative for Anchorage as draft plans, 
in compliance with its constitutional obligations.91 
The Board and its staff prepared two of the draft plans.  These 
were designated Plan 1 and Plan 2.  They included an alternative 
regional plan for Anchorage that could be used with either alterna-
tive.92  Plan 1 remained essentially unchanged from the draft pre-
pared by staff, but Plan 2 incorporated numerous changes made by 
the Board as a result of the work sessions and public meetings be-
tween April 10 and April 18.93 
The third plan was prepared by a citizens’ group, Alaskans for 
Fair Redistricting (“AFFR”).94  This was a statewide coalition of 
Native corporations, individuals, labor unions, and environmental 
organizations.95  Juneau attorney Myra Munson, who spearheaded 
the litigation against Governor Hickel’s redistricting plan in 1991,96 
served as AFFR’s legal counsel.97  The Democratic Party was not 
formally affiliated with the group, but the party’s chair was instru-
mental in its formation.98  Personal staff of Democratic Governor 
Tony Knowles was deeply and openly involved in AFFR’s work, 
and the Department of Law provided support.99 
The fourth potential plan was a regional plan for southwest 
Alaska that was prepared by Calista Corporation, a regional Native 
corporation with headquarters in Bethel.  This plan sought to cre-
ate two rural districts of predominantly Native communities.100 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Observation of the author. 
 94. 2001 REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. 
 95. Sheila Toomey, Opponents of Redistricting Plan Charge Improper Influ-
ence, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 16, 2002, at B1.  AFFR described itself as “a 
broad coalition of progressive Alaskans working for an equitable redistricting plan 
that will serve to provide the best representation to Alaskan voters.” ALASKANS 
FOR FAIR REDISTRICTING, REP. TO THE ALASKA REDISTRICTING BD. AND 
PROPOSED PLAN 1 (Apr. 3, 2001), http://www.state.ak.us/redistricting/maps/affr/ 
affr_report.pdf. 
 96. Ms. Munson represented the Southeast Conference and Mut-Su Borough. 
See Hickel v. Southeast Conference, 846 P.2d 38, 41 (Alaska 1992). 
 97. Toomey, supra note 95, at B1. 
 98. Observation of the author. 
 99. Observation of the author. 
 100. The plan linked the Inupiat communities of Seward Peninsula with the up-
river Yukon Athabaskan communities to form one district and linked the Yupik 
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3. Proclamation of a Final Plan.101  Between May 4 and May 
19, public hearings were held in Anchorage (on two days), Fair-
banks, Healy, Dillingham, Delta Junction, Glennallen, Valdez, 
Cordova, Wasilla, Kenai, Homer, Galena, Bethel, Juneau, Sitka, 
Wrangell, Petersburg, Ketchikan, Angoon, and Hoonah.  Also, the 
executive director addressed a meeting of the Southwest Alaska 
Municipal Conference in Unalaska on May 11.  One of the two 
hearings in Anchorage and the hearing in Juneau were held on the 
legislature’s teleconference system to give people an opportunity to 
testify from places not visited by the Board.  The full Board at-
tended the teleconferenced hearings, and there were at least two 
board members at all of the other hearings.  The hearings were re-
corded with transcripts posted on the Board’s website.  Audio 
tapes were made available for purchase.102 
In addition to the public hearings, the Board received exten-
sive written comment on proposed plans.  Also, new and revised 
plans were submitted to the Board, including a revised plan from 
AFFR with modified districts for Anchorage and Fairbanks, two 
alternate plans for the Anchorage area submitted by the Mayor of 
Anchorage, and amendments to a plan previously submitted to the 
Board by the Matanuska-Susitna Borough Assembly.103 
The Board convened in Juneau on May 21, 2001 to begin de-
liberations over a final plan.  The meeting recessed from time to 
time so the staff could prepare material for the Board.  The Board 
also recessed from Friday, May 25, until Wednesday, June 6.  The 
meeting continued, with recesses from time to time, until approxi-
mately 5:40 on the evening of Saturday, June 9.  During this time, 
the Board allowed proponents of the various plans to explain their 
proposals.  Board member Julian Mason proposed additional revi-
sions to the revised AFFR plan, which he now called the “full rep-
resentation plan.”  The Board voted to modify two small blocks in 
the Juneau area and then adopted this as its “final” plan on June 9, 
by a vote of 3 to 2.104  The Board directed the staff to make any 
 
communities on the lower Yukon River with Athabaskan communities on the 
Kuskokwim River to form another.  ALASKA REDISTRICTING BD., SUMMARY OF 
DRAFT REDISTRICTING PLANS 2 (2001), available at http://www.state.ak.us/redis-
tricting/maps/draft_summary.pdf. 
 101. The following account of the Board’s adoption of a final plan is summa-
rized from 2001 REPORT, supra note 81, at 4–5. 
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Taking a cursory look at the “full representation” plan on her computer 
shortly before it was adopted, a Board staff member focused on her own Juneau 
District and discovered two herniated appendages along an otherwise straight 
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necessary technical corrections to the district boundary descrip-
tions, to produce a full set of maps, and to prepare written descrip-
tions of the districts for a formal proclamation of the plan on June 
18, 2001, in the Board’s Juneau office.105 
4. Litigation.  Within the thirty-day limit,106 nine lawsuits chal-
lenging the Board’s final plan were filed in superior courts around 
the state; these complaints were consolidated in Anchorage before 
Judge Mark Rindner under the caption In re 2001 Redistricting 
Cases v. Redistricting Board.107  The plaintiffs were municipalities 
(the Aleutians East Borough and the cities of Valdez, Craig, Cor-
dova, and Delta Junction) and three individuals.108  A three-week 
trial began on January 7, 2002 and concluded on January 25, 2002.  
Judge Rindner declared House Districts 12 and 16 in the final plan 
to be unconstitutional and dismissed all other claims.109 
The Alaska Supreme Court entertained petitions for review of 
the superior court order.  Parties to the litigation presented oral ar-
guments in mid-March, and the court ruled on March 21, 2002.110  
The supreme court affirmed Judge Rindner’s orders that were not 
inconsistent with its own decision and remanded the plan to the 
Board with rulings that went well beyond those of the superior 
court.111  It affirmed the unconstitutionality of District 16 because it 
contained a bizarrely shaped appendage and was insufficiently 
compact.112  It also declared District 5 to be non-compact, and or-
dered the Board to redraw it or to expressly find that the Voting 
Rights Act required such a configuration in the Board’s plan.113  
The court ordered the Board to reconsider Districts 12 and 32, be-
 
boundary that suggested they were intended to include a particular residence and 
exclude another from House District 4.  These were called to the attention of 
board members and all agreed that they should be deleted.  There was no time for 
the staff to examine any other district boundaries at this level of detail.  Observa-
tion of the author. 
 105. 2001 REPORT, supra note 81, at 5. 
 106. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 11. 
 107. Mem. and Order at 22 n.13, In re 2001 Redistricting Cases v. Redistricting 
Bd., No. 3AN-01-8914 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/redistricting/litigation/Memorandum_and_Opinion.pdf. 
 108. Id.  Several of the suits also named board members and the executive di-
rector, but these named defendants were subsequently dropped. 
 109. Id. at 121. 
 110. In re 2001 Redistricting Cases v. Redistricting Bd., 44 P.3d 141 (Alaska 
2002). 
 111. Id. at 143–47. 
 112. Id. at 143. 
 113. Id. 
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cause the Board was mistaken in its interpretation of the court’s 
doctrine of proportionality enunciated in a prior redistricting case 
and was therefore unduly constrained in its view of the permissible 
range of options for these areas.114  The court directed the Board to 
take a “hard look” at alternatives for Delta Junction, with a view to 
preserving areas of socioeconomic integration.115  It also ruled that 
the population deviations from the ideal House district size in the 
Anchorage area were unconstitutionally large, and directed the 
Board to redraw these districts making a good faith effort to reduce 
the population deviations.116  Finally, the court ruled that the Board 
did not adequately justify the population deviation (of minus 6.9%) 
in rural District 40.117  Following the supreme court’s order, the su-
perior court remanded the plan to the Board for corrective ac-
tion.118 
5. Adoption of Amended Final Plan.119  On April 12, 2002 the 
Board met to begin work on an amended final plan.120 It had previ-
ously announced that it would receive proposed plans, both state-
wide and regional, from outside groups, provided they were sub-
mitted by close-of-business on April 9.121  In response, several 
groups and individuals submitted plans.  The Matanuska-Susitna 
Borough Assembly submitted a plan for its borough.122  The Calista 
Corporation and an individual (Randy Ruedrich, chair of the 
Alaska Republican Party) submitted statewide plans.123  The Mayor 
of Anchorage submitted two alternative plans for the Anchorage 
 
 114. Id. at 143–44. 
 115. Id. at 144–45. 
 116. Id. at 145–46. 
 117. Id. at 146. 
 118. See Mem. and Order Regarding Amended Final Redistricting Plan, In re 
2001 Redistricting Cases v. Redistricting Bd., No. 3AN-01-8914 CI (Alaska Super. 
Ct. May 9, 2002), reprinted in In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 47 P.3d 1089, app. at 
1092–95 (Alaska 2002). 
 119. The following account of the work of the Board in adopting an amended 
final plan is summarized from ALASKA REDISTRICTING BD., REP. TO ACCOMPANY 
REDISTRICTING PROCLAMATION OF APR. 25, 2002 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 
REPORT].  For clarity and precision, this summary reproduces the key aspects of 
the report as closely as possible.  The term “amended final plan” was used by the 
Board with the aim of discouraging the claim that it was adopting a new final plan 
which would require a new round of public hearings.  Observation of the author. 
 120. 2002 REPORT, supra note 119, at 2. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
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Bowl.124  AFFR submitted three alternatives.125  Board member Ma-
son also prepared a proposal and submitted it to the Board by the 
April 9 deadline.126  Mason developed this proposal in negotiations 
with representatives of several plaintiffs in the consolidated lawsuit 
against the Board, and with various legislators.127  This plan revised 
the districts that the supreme court had directed the Board to 
change or reconsider and re-drew the Anchorage districts to reduce 
the maximum population deviation to 1.35 percent.128  Board staff 
posted all these proposals on the Board’s website on April 10.129 
At the meeting of April 12, the Board considered a total of 
nineteen redistricting scenarios, ten of which were prepared by the 
Board’s staff.130  The staff scenarios were both statewide and re-
gional, and the scenarios included various revisions of draft Plans 1 
and 2, as well as new conceptual redistricting solutions in compli-
ance with the court orders.131  Deliberations came to focus on  Ma-
son’s draft plan.132  Attorneys for a number of plaintiffs and inter-
veners in the redistricting litigation said either that the plan was 
satisfactory to their clients or that they would recommend that 
their clients accept it.  The Board’s attorney opined that the plan 
satisfied the orders of the supreme court.133  On April 13, the Board 
unanimously adopted this plan, pending technical review by staff.134  
A formal proclamation was made to the general public on April 25, 
2002. 
On May 9, Superior Court Judge Rindner upheld the amended 
plan in its entirety, against objections from two of the original nine 
plaintiffs and from a few individuals new to the litigation who com-
plained about their districts in north Anchorage.135  The judge 
found that the Board had justified the non-compact shape of 
House District 5 on the grounds of necessity under the Voting 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Observation of the author. 
 128. Observation of the author. 
 129. 2002 REPORT, supra note 119, at 2. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Observation of the author. 
 134. 2002 REPORT, supra note 119, at 2. 
 135. In re 2001 Redistricting Cases v. Alaska Redistricting Bd., No. 3AN–01–
8914 CI, at 3, 12 (Alaska Super. Ct. May 9, 2002), 
http://www.state.ak.us/redistricting/litigation/FinalJudgment050902.pdf. 
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Rights Act.136 The judge further found that no evidentiary hearing 
was necessary to resolve any of the objections to the plan, holding 
that it fully complied with the order of the supreme court and was 
constitutional in all respects.137  The Alaska Supreme Court heard 
oral argument on May 24, 2002, and issued an order the same day 
affirming the superior court ruling.138 
The United States Department of Justice granted pre-
clearance to the amended final plan on June 10, 2002.139  The 
Alaska Redistricting Board held its last meeting and officially dis-
banded on December 13, 2002.140 
III.  A NEW APPROACH TO LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 
A. The 1998 Amendment Facilitates Partisan Redistricting 
The courts’ acceptance of the Alaska Redistricting Board’s 
procedures, together with the method specified in Section 8 for ap-
pointing members to the Board, all but guarantee that future redis-
tricting maps will be drawn by one party behind closed doors. 
The nine plaintiffs who sued over the final plan complained to 
the courts about the procedures used by the Board to adopt the 
plan, alleging a denial of due process.141  The judges rejected these 
claims.142  The Board went through a public process: it held numer-
ous public hearings; it invited the submission of plans; it viewed the 
plans and heard presentations from every individual and group that 
asked to make one; and it conducted all of its business in public.143  
At the end of the ninety-day deadline, it adopted without signifi-
 
 136. Id. at 9. 
 137. Id. at 2. 
 138. See In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 47 P.3d 1089, 1090 (Alaska 2002). 
 139. Joseph D. Rich, Acting Chief, Voting Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No-
tice of Preclearance Activity under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (June 14, 2002), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/notices/vnote061402.html. 
 140. Transcript of Final Meeting, Alaska Redistricting Bd. (Dec. 13, 2002), 
http://www.state.ak.us/redistricting/minutes/m_12_13_02_finalmeeting.htm. 
 141. Mem. and Order at 41–51, In re 2001 Redistricting Cases v. Redistricting 
Bd., No. 3AN-01-8914 CI (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 1, 2002), available at 
http://www.state.ak.us/redistricting/litigation/Memorandum_and_Opinion.pdf. 
 142. Id. at 49–64.  There was one exception: Judge Rindner ruled that the 
Board violated the state’s Open Meetings Act by arranging the dates and loca-
tions of its public hearings by email among board members and staff, rather than 
in a public meeting.  But because the subject matter was procedural and not sub-
stantive, he found the transgression insufficiently serious to void the work of the 
Board.  Id. at 47–48. 
 143. Id. at 49–56. 
02__HARRISON.DOC 6/5/2006  3:59 PM 
2006] LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING 71 
cant amendment a plan that was crafted by AFFR, a group with 
ties to the Democrats, but everyone had had a chance to speak.144 
Nonetheless, that one party will have at least a three-member 
majority on the Board to give the nod to its side’s proposal is virtu-
ally assured by the method of appointing Board members.  As pre-
viously described, this method has the Speaker of the House and 
the President of the Senate each appointing a member, and the 
governor appointing two.145  The Chief Justice of the Alaska Su-
preme Court appoints the fifth.146  If at the time of appointment the 
leader of one chamber is of the same party as the governor, that 
party would have a three-member majority regardless of the party 
allegiance of the supreme court’s appointee.  If, at the time ap-
pointments are made, both legislative leaders are of the same party 
as the governor (as they are at the time of this writing), that party 
would have a four-member majority without the judicial appointee.  
Given Alaska’s past political landscape, both Republicans and 
Democrats have had the opportunity to appoint two members of 
the first Alaska Redistricting Board; however, there is no assurance 
in the future that these appointments will continue to be politically 
balanced.  Furthermore, the fifth member is not selected by the 
others, but is appointed by the Chief Justice, and is under no legal 
or moral obligation to function as a neutral referee on the Board.  
The fifth member may align himself or herself with any of the other 
appointees.  Thus, the appointment rules are not designed to pro-
duce a bipartisan Redistricting Board with a tie-breaking fifth 
member, which is the preferred arrangement for redistricting 
commissions.147  Rather, members are named by elected officials 
who have a vital interest in the outcome of the panel’s work, and 
they should not be expected to be impartial.  Indeed, it is likely im-
 
 144. Id. at 57–58. 
 145. ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 8. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See Jeffrey C. Kubin, The Case for Redistricting Commissions, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 837, 839–40 (1997); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for 
Establishing Legislative Districts, in REPRESENTATION AND DISTRICTING ISSUES 7, 
10–11 (Bernard Grofman et al. eds., 1982).  There is a common misunderstanding 
that bipartisan commissions with a tie-breaking fifth member are removed from 
the political fray and act in an independent and politically disinterested manner.  
See generally, Bruce Adams, A Model State Reapportionment Process: The Con-
tinuing Quest for ‘Fair and Effective Representation’, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 825 
(1977). 
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possible to create a genuinely and reliably neutral commission to 
deal with redistricting issues.148 
Presumably the Alaska electorate ratified Ballot Measure 3 in 
1998 with the expectation of getting a redistricting mechanism less 
susceptible to partisan manipulation than the one it was replacing.  
The statement in favor of the proposed amendment published in 
the state’s election pamphlet declared that the new Board was “in-
tended to produce balanced, professionally-drawn redistricting 
plans,” and would replace a procedure that “has produced redis-
tricting plans which have been subject to criticism of being partisan 
and gerrymandered rather than creating redistricting plans based 
on bipartisan fairness and objectivity.”149  It is in the general pub-
lic’s interest to avoid having redistricting maps that were drawn by 
only one party. 
B. Redistricting Should be a Legislative Responsibility, with a 
Requirement for Supermajority Vote 
Consequently, a new approach must be found to the decennial 
task of legislative redistricting in Alaska.  Redistricting by the gov-
ernor and redistricting by an appointed Board have both resulted 
in one-party plans and prolonged litigation.  It is time to think the 
unthinkable: return redistricting to the legislature itself. 
This proposal runs counter to the advice of many redistricting 
reformers who favor the use of an independent commission.150  
However, legislatures are the usual and traditional forum for redis-
 
 148. “There is a sort of vague impression in many quarters . . . that something 
called nonpartisanship can be built into the districting process.  My own experi-
ence tells me that although I may find nonpartisanship in heaven, in the real 
world . . . there are no nonpartisans, although there may be noncombatants.”  
Dixon, supra note 147, at 8. 
 149. Alaska 1998 Official Election Pamphlet—Ballot Measure 3, 
http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/1998oep/98bal3.htm (last visited Mar. 
27, 2006).  The statement was signed by Republicans Eldon Mulder, a Representa-
tive, and Brian Porter, Speaker of the House; both were co-sponsors of the meas-
ure. 
 150. See generally Adams, supra note 147 (recommending an independent 
commission with judicial review); Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the Peo-
ple’s Business: An Examination of the Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative 
Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115 (2004) (arguing for the 
adoption of such an independent bipartisan commission in Kansas); Kubin, supra 
note 147 (arguing for a bipartisan commission with a tie-breaking chairman); 
O’Neill, supra note 6, at 683–85 (recommending that Congress require all states to 
use redistricting commissions). 
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tricting.151  State legislatures have the ultimate authority for both 
congressional and legislative redistricting in all but twelve states.152 
Delegates to Alaska’s Constitutional Convention vested redis-
tricting authority in the office of the governor because legislatures 
were notorious for evading the responsibility.  But that was then, 
before Baker v. Carr and its progeny.  Now the state constitution 
and federal law require reapportionment every ten years, and 
courts are willing to hear complaints about tardiness in the matter. 
Redistricting plans emanating from legislatures have at times 
been famously and bitterly contentious,153 but this conflict most of-
ten occurs when one of the major parties has exclusive control over 
the process.  When both parties play a role, they are forced to ne-
gotiate and compromise in order to pass a reapportionment bill.154  
Thus, for the Alaska legislature to assume the authority for its own 
redistricting, both major parties must be assured of participating in 
the drafting and passage of a plan.  This can be accomplished by 
requiring a three-fourths supermajority vote in each chamber to 
pass a redistricting bill.155 
 
 151. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that reapportionment planning is a legis-
lative task.  Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1978).  “We have repeatedly 
emphasized that ‘legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for legislative 
consideration and determination,’ for a state legislature is the institution that is by 
far the best situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within 
the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality.” 
Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414–15 (1977) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533, 586 (1964)). 
 152. Redistricting Comm’ns, Nat’l Conf. of State Leg., 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/redistrict/com&alter.htm (last visited Mar. 
27, 2006).  This overview of the subject says the record of redistricting commis-
sions is “inconsistent.”  Id. 
 153. The most recent partisan gerrymandering to reach national attention oc-
curred in 2003 when the Texas legislature redrew state congressional districts.  
The governor and the majority of both houses of the legislature were Republican.  
See Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Let’s Mess with Texas, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1587, 1587–88 (2004). 
 154. Political scientists David Butler and Bruce Cain say that bipartisan con-
sensus is more common than partisan gerrymandering in the United States be-
cause typically neither party has complete control of the redistricting process in 
the legislature.  “If at least one of the state legislative houses or the governorship 
is in different hands, the effect will be similar to a two-thirds vote requirement or 
to an evenly balanced commission.”  DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, 
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 152–53 (1992). 
 155. This supermajority vote would be comparable to the three-fourths super-
majority vote required by Section 17(c) of Article IX to exceed the restrictions on 
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Furthermore, if the parties are going to negotiate a redistrict-
ing plan, the negotiations must be fair.  The minority party must 
have the resources necessary to design redistricting proposals and 
analyze those of the opposition.  This means adequate staff, mod-
ern computers and software, and access to data.  A constitutional 
amendment to vest authority for redistricting in the legislature 
should require passage of the bill by a supermajority vote in each 
chamber, and it should specify equality of resources for preparing 
redistricting plans.156 
Finally, the constitutional amendment must specify a deadline 
for the legislature to act.  The current ninety-day deadline for 
adoption of a final plan after the U.S. Bureau of the Census deliv-
ers redistricting data to the state might well be extended another 
thirty days.  However, the timeline must be condensed enough to 
allow judicial challenges to the plan to be resolved before the filing 
deadline for legislative seats on June 1 of the following year. 
This approach to redistricting recognizes the process for what 
it is: a bruising bout of bare-knuckle politics in which the players 
fight for their political survival and for control of the legislative 
machinery.  Removing responsibility for redistricting from the leg-
islature does not remove legislative politics from the process.157  As-
signing the task to a commission does not mute the clash of parti-
san interests; it merely shifts the locus of battle.  The best place for 
a legislative fight is in the legislature, and legislators are the best 
fighters because they know best their own personal and partisan in-
terests.158 
 
appropriating from the Budget Reserve Fund.  See ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 17.  
The supermajority vote requirement in Article IX has made the budgeting process 
in recent years far more bipartisan than it would otherwise have been. 
 156. Because a bill requires the governor’s signature, the governor would be 
involved in the process.  However, the governor would not be a major player be-
cause the legislature could easily override a veto of a redistricting bill it had just 
passed with a three-fourths majority in each house. 
 157. “The view held by Common Cause and other civic groups that politics can 
be taken out of districting by shifting districting responsibility to nonpartisan or 
bipartisan commissions is, in my view, misguided.  First, it cannot be done; second, 
even if it could be done, it should not be done.”  Grofman, supra note 11, at 124. 
 158. Nathaniel Persily argues that the legislature is preferable to a commission 
for redistricting for a number of reasons.  Among them, “redistricting can be a 
part of substantive policymaking and administration.  Legislative bargains in the 
redistricting process are not completely detached from others that occur through-
out a legislative session.  Through redistricting, legislatures not only make the 
tough value-laden decisions as to how communities should be represented, but 
they create service relationships between representatives and constituents that fit 
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In other words, the legislature is superior to a commission for 
thrashing out a redistricting plan because it is structured to handle 
political conflict.  Its rules do not constrain it to operate in public.  
Alaska’s Open Meetings Act prohibits the members of a public 
board from discussing the substantive business of the board pri-
vately.159  The politics that drive the design of a redistricting plan 
are not a subject for public discussion, and therefore a commission 
must allow others, including its own staff or outside groups, to do 
the real work of redistricting.  Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Alaska Redistricting Board adopted a final plan ready-made by 
AFFR, and later an amended final plan that was negotiated pri-
vately by one board member and key stakeholders. 
Unfortunately, the public is confused about the commission’s 
work.  The popular impression is that a commission is insulated 
from politics and its members strive in good faith to write their own 
plan that is free of partisan bias.  Few Alaskans today realize that 
the members of the Alaska Redistricting Board and its staff did not 
participate in drafting the plans the Board adopted.  A redistricting 
plan from the legislature would not be shielded by an aura of im-
partiality; it would be looked at squarely by the public as the prod-
uct of the legislative process, like any other legislative act. 
C. Rebuttal of Objections to Legislative Districting 
A criticism of allowing legislators to create bipartisan redis-
tricting plans is that they collude to perpetuate the political status 
quo by creating safe seats for both parties and individual incum-
bents.  These collusive agreements, or bipartisan gerrymanders, 
have been described as analogous to market-sharing agreements 
among corporate cartels that stifle competition, and they are the 
subject of much academic hand-wringing.160 
However, any bipartisan plan will be a collusive agreement to 
protect the status quo—even those produced by a bipartisan com-
mission that operates as designed to operate (that is, with a neutral, 
tie-breaking member who effectively forces the partisan members 
to compromise and cooperate in designing a plan).161  The virtue of 
bipartisan plans, whether produced by a commission or the legisla-
 
into larger public policy programs.  The removal of politics from redistricting 
seeks to break these relationships.”  Persily, supra note 3, at 679. 
 159. Open Meetings Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310–.312 (2004). 
 160. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002). 
 161. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Meas-
uring Fairness in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J. 1547, 1574–76 (2005)(critiquing bipar-
tisan commissions). 
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ture, is that they reflect the relative electoral strength of the two 
major parties.162  The Supreme Court approved just such a plan, 
finding no fault with a bipartisan gerrymander that provided a 
rough approximation of the proportional representation of the two 
major parties in the halls of the legislature.163  While they are not 
ideal, bipartisan redistricting plans are the best that can be hoped 
for in the real world.  They are manifestly superior to gerryman-
ders by a single party that unduly distort the strength of the domi-
nant party, making the electoral system even less responsive to the 
shifting preferences of voters. 
The main risk of returning the task of redistricting to the legis-
lature under a supermajority rule is the risk of deadlock.  It could 
happen that the two major parties cannot come to terms on a plan 
by the constitutional deadline.  In this case, any qualified voter 
could bring suit against the legislature under Section 11 to compel 
the body to perform its duties.164  This sort of suit would inevitably 
occur, and the courts would be forced to impose an interim plan in 
the absence of redistricting legislation.  This prospect is an unhappy 
one for the judiciary, which has no explicit constitutional authority 
for creating interim redistricting plans.  However, twice the courts 
have imposed a set of interim election districts for Alaska (in 1972 
and 1992).165  The uncertainty associated with judicial preemption 
should provide sufficient incentive for the legislators to patch up 
their differences.166 
Another risk of saddling the legislature with the task of redis-
tricting is that it might totally preoccupy the body during its 120-
day session, to the detriment of other legislative business.  But 
there are steps the legislature could take to streamline its handling 
 
 162. The legitimacy of the status quo is weakened to the extent it is based on a 
previous partisan gerrymander.  However, bipartisan plans consistently result in 
higher fidelity to the ideal vote-seat relationship than do partisan plans.  See Mi-
chael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 445 (1993) 
(proposing that judges evaluate claims of illegal partisan gerrymandering by com-
paring the differences between a likely bipartisan plan and the one being scruti-
nized). 
 163. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973). 
 164. Section 11, the enforcement provision of Article VI, would not be changed 
substantively by the constitutional amendment proposed here.  The word “legisla-
ture” would be substituted for “Alaska Redistricting Board.”  See ALASKA CONST. 
art. VI, § 11. 
 165. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 166. This Comment does not recommend a “back up” commission or set of 
designated officials to develop a redistricting plan if the legislature fails to act.  
The court-imposed interim plan would remain in effect until the legislature passed 
a redistricting bill. 
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of this complicated, time-consuming task.  For example, the legisla-
ture could (and doubtless would) appoint a special joint committee 
that would initiate preparations for redistricting well ahead of the 
release of federal census data (e.g., purchasing computer systems 
and redistricting software, and/or contracting for studies necessary 
to show compliance with the Voting Rights Act).  The legislature 
could hire a specialized staff to negotiate a draft plan.167  In any 
case, the matter of redistricting is sufficiently complex and techni-
cal such that specialized structures and procedures would have to 
be devised to make it manageable by the legislature.  As another 
means of avoiding preoccupation with redistricting, the legislature 
could choose to deal with the matter in a special session following 
the close of the regular session in early May. 
An objection to another constitutional amendment to Article 
VI is that the current guidelines for drawing election districts—
equal population, contiguity, compactness, respect for local gov-
ernment boundaries, and socio-economic integration—provide a 
sufficient barrier to partisan gerrymandering.168  These guidelines 
impose important constraints on the drawing of election district 
boundaries.  Their diligent enforcement by the Alaska Supreme 
Court in In re 2001 Redistricting Cases led the Alaska Redistricting 
Board to amend its final plan significantly enough to attract a 
unanimous vote for adoption.  The substantive requirements of 
Section 6 would remain unchanged by the amendment being pro-
posed here.  To pass constitutional muster, the legislature’s plan 
would have to respect these requirements.  However, only a person 
who has never worked with modern redistricting computer pro-
grams would argue that the constitutional guidelines are a bulwark 
against gerrymandering.169  There is ample opportunity for mischief 
 
 167. The legislature should not create a public advisory board, because the 
board would be prohibited by the Open Meetings Act from engaging in the type 
of negotiation that is essential to preparing a viable bipartisan plan. Open Meet-
ings Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310–.312 (2004).  Also, the legislature should not 
simply seek to amend the constitution to require legislative ratification by a su-
permajority vote of a plan adopted by the Alaska Redistricting Board.  The only 
way a board plan would be readily ratified is if legislators were directly or indi-
rectly involved in its preparation.  It would be more efficient for the legislature to 
create a mechanism using legislative staff to prepare a draft plan. 
 168. See ALASKA CONST. art. VI, § 6 . 
 169. “The commonly held view that reliance on formal criteria such as com-
pactness or equal population can prevent gerrymandering is simply wrong.”  Grof-
man, supra note 11, at 88. 
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within the bounds of these standards.170  For example, in urban ar-
eas the requirement for compactness may coincide nicely with the 
less reputable aim of “packing” districts with voters of a particular 
stripe.171  In modern rural Alaska, House districts necessarily en-
compass vast areas and the concepts of compactness and socio-
economic integration are meaningless.  It is not possible to draft a 
statewide redistricting plan for Alaska that comports with all of the 
constitutional guidelines of Section 6, but if it were, the plan could 
nonetheless be abusively biased. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
In the recent redistricting cycle in Alaska, the newly created 
Alaska Redistricting Board did not function as a bipartisan redis-
tricting commission.  There is no reason to expect it to do so in the 
future.  Thus, the new Board is no improvement over the method 
of gubernatorial redistricting that it replaced.  By both methods, 
one party may partition the state into election districts of its choice, 
constrained only by constitutional standards that are by no means a 
complete barrier to gerrymandering. 
Partisan gerrymandering insults the democratic values of fair 
and equal representation for all citizens.  Harm to the public inter-
est from partisan gerrymanders can be avoided by giving both ma-
jor parties a role in the redistricting process.  Bipartisan participa-
tion can be accomplished by assigning the task to the legislature 
and requiring a supermajority vote to pass a redistricting bill.  Pub-
lic commissions such as the Alaska Redistricting Board are ill-
suited to the rough-and-tumble politics of redistricting.  Conflicts 
over redistricting are best resolved in the legislature. 
A legislatively drawn redistricting plan will be self-serving, to 
be sure, but it should reasonably reflect the relative electoral 
strength of the two major parties.  This outcome may not be an 
 
 170. “With the recent advent of sophisticated computer redistricting soft-
ware . . . it must be admitted that the gerrymanderer’s ability to craft a plan 
around any set of redistricting standards is virtually limitless.”  Kubin, supra note 
147, at 854. 
 171. All of the area encompassed by a municipal boundary is considered to be 
integrated from a social and economic point of view, so any compact district is le-
gal if it meets the population criterion.  The Alaska Supreme Court has stated: 
“Anchorage is by definition socio-economically integrated, and its population is 
sufficiently dense and evenly spread to allow multiple combinations of compact, 
contiguous districts with minimal population deviations.”  In re 2001 Redistricting 
Cases, 44 P.3d 141, 146 (Alaska 2002).  In fact, the population of Anchorage is not 
evenly spread, so the court’s emphasis on population equality elevated that stan-
dard above compactness. 
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ideal one, but it is an improvement over a redistricting plan that 
gives a disproportionately large electoral advantage to the major 
party.  A bipartisan redistricting plan is the best that can be hoped 
for in the real political world. 
